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ENGAGING WITH GENOCIDE – THE CHALLENGE FOR 
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
 
Genocide has long cast a shadow over human history. Its currency and resurgence in 
the 20th century with its shocking photographic and cinematic records has brought its 
full horrors to public consciousness. Within this period, the Nazi Holocaust has come 
in many enduring ways to epitomise the crimes of mass extermination and ethnic 
cleansing. Current circumstances suggest genocide will continue to tarnish human 
civilization for some time to come. In this paper, we will examine some of the 
organizational issues raised by genocide and will indicate some of the lessons that 
management and organization scholars can derive from its political, psychological 
and moral dimensions. We shall propose that genocide far from constituting a tragic 
phenomenon at the margins of contemporary society raises questions that go to the 
heart of organization and management studies. 
 
Genocide is sometimes thought of as an exceptional or rare phenomenon; but it is not. 
Genocide Watch (2008) estimates that since the foundation of the United Nations 
there have been 45 genocides and over 70 million dead. Environmental and financial 
disasters, depletion of raw materials, land erosion and the continuing movement and 
mixing of populations on an unprecedented scale make future genocides even more 
likely. But if killing on a mass scale were not common enough, genocide can assume 
other less direct forms.  Depriving communities of their dignity and pride, of the 
means of maintaining their traditions and practices and of sustaining their natural 
environment, in short the wide array of practices referred to as necropolitics 
(Mbembe, 2003) or necrocapitalism (Banerjee, 2008) may constitute cultural and 
spiritual versions of genocide. No academic discipline has any excuses for turning its 
sights away from the topic, least of all organizational studies. Genocide, as we shall 
see, is a highly organized process, requiring bureaucratic resources to initiate, sustain 
and, often, cover it up. It generates resistance and compliance, it makes use of 
material and social technologies, it is imbued with its own cultural values and 
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assumptions and calls for its own morbid innovations and problem-solving. Genocide 
requires the collaboration of numerous formal organizations, including armies, 
suppliers, intelligence and other services, but also informal networks and groups. Far 
from being peripheral to the world of organizations, we shall argue that genocide is 
central to some of its core concerns.  
 
At the outset, we must offer three qualifications. First, while several references are 
made to the Nazi Holocaust, the paper addresses more generally genocides, rather 
than the Holocaust in particular. There are wide-ranging and at times rancorous 
arguments as to whether the Jewish Holocaust can be seen as a special case of a more 
general phenomenon, just as there are arguments as to whether genocide is itself a 
special case of a more general phenomenon, such as modernity’s rationalizing 
tendencies. These are some of the core issues that will be addressed in this paper. 
Second, in the paper we draw certain analogues between genocidal actions and the 
experiences of everyday life in organizations; for example, we indicate certain 
similarities between ethnic cleansing and symbolic cleansing in organizations, and 
between genocide and organizational downsizing. In drawing such comparisons we 
are acutely mindful of the need to respect the memories and experiences of  victims 
and survivors of genocide. We are not arguing that genocide and the quotidian 
worklife in organizations possess the same ‘ontological’ qualities, or that ‘hot’ 
violence experienced by victims of genocide is commensurate with the violation 
experienced by victims of organizational bullying and downsizing. We will, however, 
make a case that there are profound similarities in the social, political and 
psychological dynamics that underpin both of these domains and that it is wrong to 
regard genocide as an exceptional event that calls for different categories from those 
of ‘normal’ human sciences. Third, there are currently heated debates on whether any 
lessons at all can be learnt from extreme or unique events. Some historians, like 
Novick (1999) and others such as Elie Wiesel have argued, from very different 
perspectives, that the Holocaust can hold no lessons. We understand concerns about 
the possibility of trivializing and obfuscating genocide through ‘wild lessons’ and 
rash conclusions and generalizations; yet, we strongly share the views of those who 
believe that genocide contains lessons both for humankind in general and for different 
academic disciplines including organizational theory. As leading Holocaust historian 
Yehuda Bauer (2001, p. xiii) has argued, “the warning to humankind is written on the 
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wall: beware and learn. Learning is crucial here, not only for Jews but for everyone, 
children as well as adults.”  
 
The term genocide was introduced by Polish scholar Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), 
deriging from genos (meaning tribe or race) and –cide (to kill, to massacre) (Lemkin, 
1944). From the start, genocide turned out to be one of these essentially contested 
concepts (Gallie, 1964), whose definition and ambit are subject to intense struggles. 
The widely-used United Nations definition of genocide as acts “committed with the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group” 
(Article Two, United Nations Convention on Genocide January 1951) was itself the 
product of intense negotiation. Political killings were excluded from the definition, 
while religious killings, which did not form part of the original Lemkin definition, 
were included.  The literature on genocide is wrought with contested and competing 
attempts to define the key dimensions of the phenomenon (Chalk and Jonassohn, 
1990; Totten, Parson and Charny, 1997; Shaw, 2007). Some commentators have 
sought to identify different forms of genocide, for example, politicide (the 
extermination of a political class) or gendercide (the contrasting treatments and 
extermination of a particular gender within a targeted group or population as occurred 
in the Bosnian conflict). Two enduring and unresolved questions in defining genocide 
concern, first, whether it necessarily involves the physical extermination of every 
member of a group (or some determined number) and whether destroying its spiritual 
and cultural traditions constitutes genocide; second, whether the intention to destroy 
and to kill is necessary for genocide to occur or whether genocide can be an 
‘unanticipated consequence’ of different policies and actions.   
 
It is our view that the disciplines of management and organizational studies cannot 
remain passive audiences of these struggles, but must begin to debate genocide 
themselves, even at the cost of getting tangled up in awkward questions. In the past, 
academics in these disciplines have taken a partial interest in genocide. Yet, there are 
many ways in which genocide is a feature of their domain. While some genocidal 
incidents may appear to arise spontaneously and without premeditation, genocide is, 
generally, planned, organized and controlled. In order to exterminate large numbers of 
people, resources must be made available, actions must be co-ordinated, information 
must be shared and individuals must be motivated to perform various tasks. Victims 
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must be identified, corralled, killed; their bodies must be disposed and, often, 
evidence of the actions covered up. In all these ways, genocide entails extensive  
managerial and organizational processes. Thus, for example, genocides in the 
Twentieth Century - Armenia, the Nazi Holocaust, Stalin’s purges, Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution, Cambodian politicide, ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the Balkan conflict or 
Rwanda - have relied to a greater or lesser extent on management practices, ideas and 
philosophies typical of their times.  
 
One of the reasons for organizational theorists’ limited interest in genocide is that it is 
widely viewed as an extreme or exceptional event. But as Agamben (1998) has 
argued, the ability to define an event as exceptional is itself an act of organized power 
or sovereignty that calls for questioning. Furthermore, we will argue that many of the 
processes involved in genocide, political, social, psychological and moral, are not 
fundamentally different from those encountered in less extreme organizational 
phenomena. Thus, the implications of Milgram’s (1974) well-known experiments into 
how humans can be managed, coerced or coaxed into participating in abhorrent 
actions are relevant for the study of genocide but also a broad range of other social 
situations. Complicity and compliance, ranging from enthusiastic engagement to 
passive acquiescence and silence, are features of genocide, but so too are resistance, 
passive and active, of both victims and potential perpetrators, a theme which has long 
been of vital interest to scholars of organizations. The moral questions raised by 
involvement in genocide may not be totally dissimilar from moral questions raised in 
the course of ordinary organizational lives by mass lay-offs and redundancies (Stein, 
2001; Uchitelle, 2006), environmental destruction and economic exploitation (Farmer, 
2005; Klein, 2007).  In all these ways, genocide represents a challenge for 
organizational theorists in two regards – first, to unlock the organizational and 
managerial processes that make it possible, and, second, to investigate the extent to 
which these processes apply to non-genocidal situations.  
 
ORGANIZATION AND GENOCIDE 
 
While organization and management studies have shown some limited interest in it 
(e.g.Burrell, 1997; Clegg, Kornberger, & Pitsis, 2005; Grey, 2005,  2007; ten Bos, 
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1997), genocide has received thorough, extensive and ongoing attention by other 
disciplines. Discussions on genocide and the Holocaust, are constant in the pages of 
the mass media; images, films, television programmes, books, magazine articles, 
museums and other cultural artifacts dedicated to genocide (and, in particular, the 
Nazi Holocaust) saturate contemporary culture. In mid-2009, Amazon listed 6,600 
books with ‘holocaust’ in the title, 1500 with ‘Auschwitz’, a number greater than that 
with ‘General Motors’ (1200). Scholars have turned their attention in increasing 
numbers to the phenomenon. Historians, political theorists, psychologists and, 
increasingly, sociologists, have provided many important insights into thinking and 
behaviour relating to genocidal atrocities. A new field of Genocide Studies has been 
rapidly growing and evolving with numerous journals dedicated to it. Within this 
field, Holocaust Studies is a privileged and distinct subfield. In April 2009, ISI World 
of Science listed over 6,500 scholarly articles on the Holocaust (a number only 
slightly lower than the 6,800 for ‘globalization’) and over 1,600 on genocide. Since 
the early pioneers of Holocaust research (Hilberg, 1985; Reitlinger, 1953; Schleunes, 
1970), the volume of historiography has escalated exponentially, with some 
contributions (see, for example, Bauer, 2001; Finkelstein, 2000; Friedländer, 1997; 
Goldhagen, 1996; Novick, 1999) reaching mass audiences. In addition to academic 
scholarship, genocide studies has generated diverse commentaries and genres, 
including novels, factual historical accounts, inmate and guard diaries and notebooks, 
survivors’ stories and autobiographies, films, documentaries and memoirs (ibid, and 
also Levi, 1958/1987, 1986/1988; Frank, 1947/2007; Orphuls, 1971; Keneally 1982; 
Spielberg, 1994; Miller and Touryan-Miller,1999; Hatzfeld, 2005; Wallach, 2006). It 
is curious, then, that with very few notable exceptions the disciplines of organization 
and management have remained largely indifferent.  
 
Killing on a large-scale inevitably raises issues of organization, management, 
logistics, ethics, power, hierarchy and resistance. Some of these are common to other 
large-scale, mass-produced and mass-administered organizational projects. But core 
concepts from organizational and managerial theory, such as power, structure, 
bureaucracy, hierarchy, goals, record-keeping, identity construction, control, morality, 
motivation and ideology are all revealed to have new meanings and new nuances 
within a ‘management of the business of genocide’ and a ‘genocidal organization’. In 
developing this nexus, theorists of organization and management have turned to two 
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influential theses, Hannah Arendt’s (1963) thesis of the ‘banality of evil’ stemming 
from her work Eichmann in Jerusalem and Zygmunt Bauman’s argument on 
‘adiaphorization’, or the blunting of the moral impulse effected by bureaucratic 
rationality, developed in Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) and other works. 
Arendt’s influence has been very pervasive in approaching terrible acts not as the 
motivated actions of a diabolical intelligence, but rather as outcomes of actions 
perceived by many of their perpetrators as normal and routine.  This links with 
Bauman’s view that genocide represents a natural outcome of modernity, the 
application of rational and scientific organization to mass extermination. The 
execution of genocide presents itself primarily as a mass phenomenon – a generic, 
homogenised and stratified phenomenon. In its logistical aspect, genocide is therefore 
akin to comparable modernist mass projects of production, consumption and 
administration.  
 
Bauman, relying, like Arendt, extensively on the ‘functionalist school’ historiography 
(Hilberg, 1985; Schleunes, 1970), viewed the Holocaust not as a regression from 
modernity into barbarism, but quite on the contrary, as an outcome of modernity and 
in particular the type of means-ends rationality (Weber’s Zweckrationalität) that came 
to dominate it:  
 
We need to take stock of the evidence that the civilizing process is, among 
other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence 
from moral calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality 
from interference of ethical norms or moral inhibitions. As the promotion 
of rationality to the exclusion of alternative criteria for action, and in 
particular the tendency to subordinate the use of violence to rational 
calculus, has been long ago acknowledged as a constitutive feature of 
modern civilization - the Holocaust-style phenomena must be recognized 
as legitimate outcomes of civilizing tendency, and its constant potential. 
(Bauman, 1989, p. 28) 
 
Drawing on Bauman’s work,  Grey (2005, p.25) has argued: 
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… the genocide instigated by the Nazi’s represents the extreme 
application of a bureaucratic logic. For what makes the Holocaust so 
peculiarly appalling is the way in which it was constructed industrially – 
with a systems of rules, impersonally applied, which made it as 
technically efficient as genocide could be. 
 
Grey developed the argument that the Holocaust should not be viewed as some form 
of abhorrent mutation of western society or as a regression to barbarism but as the 
climax of bureaucratic logic in the field of mass extermination, an outcome of modern 
Western society’s accumulated organizational, managerial and bureaucratic expertise 
‘… a manifestation of the habitual ways of organizing within that culture.’ (Grey, 
ibid.) Thus, in line with Arendt’s hypothesis of the banality of evil, a great deal of 
social suffering can be brought about without anyone consciously acting in a 
consciously evil or sadistic way. The radical separation between means and ends, the 
former liable to an ever-rationalizing logic, the latter inoculated from critical inquiry, 
is central to what Bauman refers to as ‘Holocaust-style phenomena’; but it can also be 
observed in numerous other spheres of violence, such as that perpetrated by military 
organizations (Jones, Parker, ten Bos 2005; Stokes 2007).   The separation, or 
distancing of the perpetrator from the victim renders the act of killing more remote 
and therefore possible because the perpetrator is ‘conveniently’ unable to see the 
consequences of his or her own actions clearly. This is precisely what Bauman means 
by ‘adiaphorization’ (1989, p. 219ff), the instilled indifference of bureaucratic 
officials to the suffering resulting from their actions. This is greatly amplified where 
the perpetrator and the victim have no face to face contact with each other.  
 
The uncoupling of means from ends is a feature of most contemporary work settings 
wherein people take actions without being mindful (or perhaps being wilfully 
mindless) to the ends, implications or consequences for other. In relation to Bauman’s 
work, Clegg, Kornberger and Pitsis (2005: 178-179) argue that: 
 
At the heart of the moral question is the interpretation of power and ethics. 
Why do ordinary people in organizations do morally bad things when 
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asked to do so? What aspects of an organization make unquestioning 
obedience feasible? (2005: 179) 
 
In this vein, they argue that all total institutions (where every aspect of members’ 
lives is shaped and controlled by the organization) have equally overpowering effects 
on both the controlling members and the controlled.   
 
Our discussion so far suggests that the theses of adiaphorization and banality of evil, 
drawn from the study of the Nazi Holocaust, may have important ramifications for 
non-genocidal phenomena. Yet, the theses themselves are contested by numerous 
genocide scholars, something that organization theorists sometimes forget at their 
peril. While acknowledging that Arendt’s book is “arguably the single most 
influential history of the Holocaust” (2005, p. 34), Michael Thad Allen  argues that 
her “cliché of Eichmann as the banal bureaucrat … has more to do with intellectuals’ 
anxieties about the modern corporation than it has to do with the Holocaust or the 
institutions of genocide” (Allen, 2005, p. 30). Far from being a banal mindless 
bureaucrat, an automaton or a ‘thoughtless cog’, Allen argues that Eichmann and 
those working under him were committed, intelligent and enthusiastic managers, who 
problem solved and showed initiative and imagination as members of an 
organizational culture that highlighted and valued these qualities. Far from being a 
declassé mediocrity, as portrayed by Arendt, Allen, using detailed analysis by Safrian 
(1995) shows Eichmann “in Berlin” rather than “in Jerusalem” to have been a self-
confident and enthusiastic member of a National Socialist vanguard with a mission to 
change the world. Eichmann’s ‘banality’ is further put into question by an analysis of 
his Rorschach profile by Robert McCully, which reveals numerous features 
“uncharacteristic of an ordinary, banal mind” (1980, p. 311),  including aesthetic 
sensibilities, pretentiousness, grandiosity, cunning and deceitfulness.  
 
Scholars of organization should be aware that, in spite of its popularity, Arendt’s 
portrayal of Eichmann is now viewed as a ‘caricature’ (Allen, 2002) by a new 
generation of scholars who have questioned the view of the Holocaust adopted by the 
earlier generation of historians, as an inexorable, bleak and bureaucratic process, and 
those, like Bauman who based their analyses on their work. Four particular criticisms 
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are relevant here – first, earlier studies underestimate the importance of ‘hot’, sadistic 
violence and emphasize the impersonality of killing; second, they exaggerate the 
efficiency of genocidal bureaucracy; third, they consistently underestimate the 
resistance of the victims; and fourth, they ignore the role of ideology and especially 
racist ideology in establishing the victim as Other and denying him/her most human 
rights.  
 
Blok (2001), an anthropologist known for his work on the Mafia, has observed that 
some acts of supreme violence are perpetrated against groups that are neighbours (and 
in many cases friendly neighbours) for years or centuries, a phenomenon that is 
confirmed by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda, 
where perpetrators and victims frequently were on personal terms. Blok links this 
phenomenon to what Freud (1921c; 1930a) terms ‘narcissism of minor differences’, 
the ‘hot and personal’ aggression displayed towards groups or individuals most like 
oneself as a way of affirming the group’s identity. Further doubt on the 
adiaphorization and banality of evil theses is cast by the evidence that runs contrary to 
the ‘mechanization of murder’ argument. Far from being a well-oiled machine, 
Yehuda Bauer (2001, p. 78), one of the leading Holocaust historians, has argued that 
Nazi bureaucracy was “often a fumbling, ineffective, contradiction-ridden machine, 
where each fiefdom in the Nazi state had its own interests and fought against every 
one else to preserve them.” Contesting Bauman’s thesis of the modernity of the 
Holocaust, Bauer argues that 
 
Because of total German military and police dominance, the Nazi 
dictatorship overcame problems of inherent inefficiency by using brute 
force, not unlike the Mongols in the thirteenth century. It is the 
combination of modern means and brutal inefficiency that is so 
characteristic of much of the Holocaust. (Bauer, 2001, p. 78) 
 
Some historians (e.g. Dammann, 2007; Snyder, 2009) now believe that a minority of 
those killed in the Nazi Holocaust were killed in gas chambers, the large majority 
killed through forced marches, summary executions or torture. In addition to cold 
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bureaucratic extermination, therefore, scholars must consider the hot violence as a 
contributor to some genocides. 
 
Another criticism that has been raised against Bauman’s and Arendt’s theses is that 
they consistently ignore Jewish resistance, treating the victims as entirely passive. In 
this, they share criticism raised against Raul Hilberg (1985, originally published 
1961) whose classic work  The Destruction of the European Jews, continues to be 
viewed as the foundation stone of Holocaust historiography. Historians (as well as 
numerous others) have criticized Hilberg for arguing that throughout the war the Jews 
went passively to their death and that the Jewish Councils in occupied territories (the 
Judenräte) were part of the machinery of destruction. An ever-increasing amount of 
historical research has revealed a broad range of resistance acts, individual and 
collective. This included smuggling food and people, underground presses, mutual 
sacrifice within families to avoid starvation, a wide range of cultural, educational and 
political activities aimed at preserving morale, as well as armed struggle (of which the 
uprising of the Warsaw ghetto is the most important). A large part of the resistance 
was aimed at maintaining morale and sanctifying the dignity of life. For all of these 
phenomena, Yehuda Bauer uses the term Amidah. Amidah then represents ‘standing’ 
firstly in the literal and then in the figurative and metaphorical senses. It is the name 
of the central prayer of Jewish Sabbath services. The congregation stand when 
saying/singing it as a mark of its significance and importance. Reaching this point 
involves a substantial spiritual and mental preparation and, as a sign of respect 
Amidah, is usually capitalized. Bauer employs it in this spirit – standing is a proactive 
one, a choice to act; he then makes it the starting point of his analysis of Jewish 
resistance. 
It means literally ‘standing up against’, but that does not capture the 
deeper sense of the word. When I speak of resistance, I mean amidah, and 
that includes both armed and unarmed actions and excludes passive 
resistance, although that term is almost a non-sequitur, because one cannot 
really resist passively. When one refuses to budge in the face of brutal 
force, one does not resist passively; one resists without using force, and 
that is not the same thing. (Bauer, 2001, p. 120)  
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Historians have established that resistance varied in extent and range from ghetto to 
ghetto and from community to community. To be sure, it was not effective at stopping 
the killing and Bauer warns that we must “strike a reasonable balance between the 
nostalgic hero worship of Jews in the Holocaust and attempts to downplay all forms 
of Amidah. The importance lies, among other things, in the need for truthful analyses 
of reactions of victims of genocide generally to further the educational process that 
may provide at least an outside chance of preventing future tragedies.” (Bauer, 2001, 
p. 166) 
 
In addition to exaggerating the passivity of the victims, Bauman and other accounts of 
genocide that approach it as an outcome of impersonal bureaucratic processes, have 
been criticized for disregarding two vital things,  the importance of local initiatives 
and the motives and ideologies of the perpetrators. Both of these criticisms exist both 
in extreme and in more moderate forms. Some historians have gone as far as arguing 
that “regional, uncoordinated initiative  provided a key and perhaps the key impetus in 
the Final Solution. ‘In the end’, writes Sandkühler, ‘ the endeavour to build gassing 
installations must be sought in local initiative’. In such accounts the Holocaust 
evolves out of the overwhelming disorganization of German institutions at the fringes 
of German society.” (Allen, 2008, p. 7) Allen, uses extensive testimonies of prisoners 
(‘grey-collar workers’, of whom more presently), to question such accounts – he 
acknowledges, however, that local initiative was essential in resolving numerous 
unexpected problems and difficulties that arose in putting into effect a central plan. 
He argues that “rather than a world of petty-minded bureaucrats in an institutional 
straightjacket, Nazi Germany unleashed a groundswell of initiative from below. This 
should be no surprise, for multi-functional bureaucrats and the enthusiasm they bring 
to their work were and are normal in modern institutions.” (Allen, 2005, p. 47) Far 
from being the mechanical output of a Weberian bureaucratic monolith operating sine 
ira et studio, Allen argues that the Nazi genocide relied on many committed, 
intelligent and enthusiastic managers and professionals (including engineers, 
architects, chemists and others) who problem-solved, innovated and showed initiative 
and imagination as members of an organizational culture that valued these qualities. 
Emotion, including highly irrational emotion, was central to the Holocaust and, in all 
likelihood, all genocide. 
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Allen is one of a new generation of Holocaust historians who has brought current 
insights from organizational theory, notably of organizations as having cultures, as 
engaging in collaborative relations with each other and as engendering emotion and 
passion, in short as institutions rather than as grey armies of mindless organization 
men acting as automata. This approach has cast serious doubts on the views of 
functionalist historians, such as Hilberg, Schleunes and Mommsen, and those like 
Arendt and Bauman who relied on their work to portray the Nazi genocide as the 
work of banal bureaucrats. But these views have been further questioned by 
intentionalist historians, who look at the Holocaust as the result of the rise of the Nazi 
Party and its radical, exterminational antisemitism to power. According to this view, 
expressed in the most extreme form in Goldhagen’s (1996) notorious book, the 
Holocaust happened because Hitler wanted it to happen and because the Germans’ 
eliminationist antisemitism enabled him to turn a murderous vision into reality. 
Goldhagen’s monocausal explanation of the Holocaust has been extensively 
challenged (not least from other intentionalist historians). It acts, however, as a useful 
corrective to the adiaphorization/banality theses which treat the victim as ‘throughput’ 
to bureaucratic processes, calling for a closer examination of the relations between the 
‘Same’ and the ‘Other’. 
 
OTHERING 
 
‘Othering’ is a concept that occupies an important place in contemporary 
philosophical, gender, postcolonial discourses. It refers to the process of casting a 
group, an individual or an object into the role of the ‘other’ and establishing one’s 
own identity through opposition to and, frequently, vilification of this Other. Othering 
is a process that goes beyond ‘mere’ scapegoating and denigration – it denies the 
Other those defining characteristics of the ‘Same’, reason, dignity, love, pride, 
heroism, nobility, and ultimately any entitlement to human rights. Whether the Other 
is a racial or a religious group, a gender group, a sexual minority or a nation, it is 
made rife for exploitation, oppression and indeed genocide by denying its essential 
humanity, because, as the philosopher Richard Rorty put it, “everything turns on who 
counts as a fellow human being, as a rational agent in the only relevant sense – the 
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sense in which rational agency is synonymous with membership of our moral 
community” (Rorty 1993:124). 
 
Theorizing the Other has drawn extensively on the work of three theorists who 
influenced each other – psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, ethnographer Claude Lévi-
Strauss and philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Lacan (1988) examined how the ego is 
formed during the early stage of infancy as each child comes to contemplate its own 
face in a mirror. The child first encounters him/herself as an Other and misrecognizes 
himself as a subject, thereafter sustaining this recognition in the gaze of the other. 
Othering is a process that may be applied to oneself, whereby one experiences oneself 
as a stranger, indeed Lacanian theory views this ‘self-othering’ as the process 
whereby the symbolic order is established – the unconscious is the stranger within 
ourselves. A man, for example, has no choice but to silence or even kill the ‘woman 
in him’. Lévi-Strauss (1955/1992) proposed that throughout human history, people 
have employed two strategies in dealing with the Other, the foreign, the deviant or the 
stranger – one is to incorporate them, as in the case of cannibalism, eliminating any 
boundaries between the same and the other; the second strategy it to expel them and 
exclude them (‘spit them out’) by erecting strong boundaries and special institutions 
in which they are kept in isolation. These strategies can be observed in many 
contemporary situations. Finally, Levinas (1969) based his moral philosophy on the 
face-to-face encounter with another human being, viewing the moment of this 
encounter as the one irreducible and concrete way of establishing a relation with the 
Other, as against relying on abstract and impersonal rules of ethics to do so.  
 
Discourses on the Other have proven extremely important in postcolonial theory; the 
politics of race, of colonial exploitation and postcolonial oppression are rooted in 
constructing the other as something less than human (Agamben, 1998; Banerjee, 
2008; Prasad, 2003). Postcolonial authors  have argued that Western identity and 
culture are fundamentally forged by an othering logic, one that dehumanizes or 
devalues other people, such as primitives, uncivilized, orientals, blacks, non-believers, 
women and so forth. An essential feature of othering is denying the Other his/her own 
voice, denying him/her the opportunity to speak for him/herself and instead attributing 
qualities, opinions and views that refer to one’s own identity and culture. Mbembe, 
focusing particularly on colonial and postcolonial contexts, builds on Foucault’s 
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notion of biopower postulating the concept of necropolitics wherein  the ultimate 
expression of sovereignty is the power over the right to kill or allow to live.  Mbembe 
views this othering process as culminating in the logic of the elimination of the other: 
 
It has been argued that the complete conflation of war and politics (and 
racism, homicide, and suicide), until they are indistinguishable from one 
another, is unique to the Nazi state. The perception of the existence of the 
Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger 
whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life and 
security—this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty 
characteristic of both early and late modernity itself. Recognition of this 
perception to a large extent underpins most traditional critiques of 
modernity, whether they are dealing with nihilism and its proclamation of 
the will for power as the essence of the being; with reification understood 
as the becoming-object of the human being; or the subordination of 
everything to impersonal logic and to the reign of calculability and 
instrumental rationality. Indeed, from an anthropological perspective, 
what these critiques implicitly contest is a definition of politics as the 
warlike relation par excellence. They also challenge the idea that, of 
necessity, the calculus of life passes through the death of the Other; or that 
sovereignty consists of the will and the capacity to kill in order to live. 
(Mbembe, 2003, p. 18) 
 
Othering is integral to genocidal processes. The Other threatens and invokes the 
separation of self between perceived ‘authentic self’ and ‘inauthentic self’; the Other 
is designated and signified as non-authentic and problematic and therefore susceptible 
to marginalisation, pathologization and eradication. In denying them voice, othering 
turns its targets, whether they are children bullied in the schoolyard or victims of 
genocide, into ‘abjects’ (Kristeva, 1982), i.e. parts ready to be cast off and treated 
with disgust and horror.  
 
The abjection suffered in the camps horribly illustrates the threat of 
exclusion which weighs on all interlocution. On the school playground, 
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the child to whom the others say ‘We are not playing with you’ 
experiences the unspeakable suffering. He suffers a wrong equivalent, on 
its own scale, to a crime against humanity. (Lyotard, 1993, p. 145) 
 
Each genocide generates unique patterns of othering (although, as we shall see 
presently, they often go through similar stages), depending on the material, 
ideological and political circumstances that separate perpetrators from victims. 
Rejecting levels of savagery and brutality as setting the Jewish Holocaust apart from 
other genocides, Bauer (2001, 44ff) argues that one of its chief qualities was the 
absence of any major economic or material rationale (although this should not obscure 
the wide seizure and sequestration of Jewish money, property and valuables by the 
Nazis – the Nazi Holocaust was very much part-financed by its victims in terms of 
money, assets, (forced) labour as well as lives). This sets it apart from the more recent 
genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda (Adelman, 2000; Gourevitch, 2004; Keane, 1995), 
where land and power were at stake. Bauer, along with many ‘intentionalist’ 
historians, then goes on to emphasize the role of ideology as one of the factors behind 
the Holocaust. Unlike Goldhagen, he rejects the view that German antisemitism was 
more virulent than those of other European nations (notably France) and argues, along 
with Friedländer (Friedländer, 1997) that what set it apart was its ‘redemptive’ 
quality. 
 
Redemptive anti-Semitism was born from the fear of racial degeneration 
and the religious belief in redemption. The main cause of degeneration 
was the penetration of the Jews into the German body politic, into German 
society, and into the German bloodstream. Germanhood and the Aryan 
world were on the path to perdition if the struggle against the Jews was 
not joined; this was to be a struggle to the death. Redemption would come 
as liberation from the Jews - as their expulsion, possibly their annihilation. 
(Friedländer, 1997, p. 87) 
 
The Nazi regime (following a long history in which Richard Wagner plays a vital 
part) sought through the annihilation of the Jews to respond to deep-rooted collective 
fears of pollution and defilement. If the Jews represented no political or economic 
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threat to the Germans, they were experienced as representing a mortal risk in terms of 
racial health and hygiene. Genocide was a form of grotesque  hygiene aimed at racial 
purification and redemption. A similar argument has been developed by psychiatrist 
Robert Jay Lifton. Building on Mary Douglas’s classic theory of pollution and 
purification, Lifton (1986) argued that that the Nazi genocide was an attempt to purify 
Germany from what was seen as the contagious sickness represented by the Jews, the 
Gypsies and all other social pathogens. Doctors colluded and even spearheaded this in 
the belief that they were helping heal the nation's body by ridding it of pathogens.   
 
The ‘disease’ with which the Nazis were attempting to cope was death 
itself, death made unmanageable by the ‘modern necrophilia’ of the First 
World War. … One way to deal with a death-saturated environment is to 
embrace death itself as the means of cure.  … Genocide requires both a 
specific victim group and certain relationships to that group. … Nazi 
perpetrators had to see their victims as posing absolute danger, as 
‘infecting’ the ‘German national body’. … The victim will destroy not 
only the perpetrator, it is claimed, but everyone and everything else. 
(Lifton, 1986, pp. 476-7) 
 
The perpetrators of genocide, argues Lifton, thought that purification would restore 
Germany to wholeness and perfection. “Genocide” he concludes “is a response to 
collective fear of pollution and defilement. It depends upon an impulse toward 
purification resembling that given collective expression in primitive cultures.” 
(Lifton, 1986, p. 481)  
 
Ethnic cleansing provides a convenient if grotesque expression to describe genocidal 
activities. It would, however, be inaccurate to argue that all genocide derives from 
fears of pollution. In fact, scholars are now acknowledging that different genocides 
have their particular physiognomies. Revenge may play a major role in some (such as 
Rwanda, see Adelman, 2000; Gourevitch, 2004; Keane, 1995) score-settling, 
imperialist expansion, racist and religious ideologies in others. In the next section, we 
shall examine some common features in the planning and execution of different 
genocides. However, in treating all genocide as subject to similar regimes of 
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organization, mobilization, politics and emotion, we must remain aware of the 
uniqueness rather than allow our revulsion to lead us to rash generalizations. As 
Moshman has argued: 
 
Given that every genocide is unique, any prototype-based notion of 
genocide will distort one's understanding of some genocides as it filters 
them through whatever genocide is taken as central and defining. 
(Moshman, 2001, p. 432) 
 
Acknowledging this point, Moses (2004) argues that scholars (including historians) 
are now accepting that it is permissible to make comparisons between genocides, 
however abhorrent it may seem and he notes that the debate needs to progress beyond 
hitherto preoccupations of ‘pious gestures’ and the establishment of ‘moral 
credentials’. (Moses, 2004, p.548)  
GENOCIDE STAGES AND SOME ORGANIZATIONAL ANALOGUES 
One scholar who has dedicated his life to understanding genocide and fighting against 
it is law professor and founder of Genocide Watch Gregory H. Stanton. On the basis 
of comparisons between several genocides, Stanton (1998) has proposed an eight-
stage model incorporating Classification (categorisation of the population(s)); 
Symbolization (assigning symbols evoking hate, for example, The Third Reich 
assignation of yellow stars for Jews); Dehumanization (rendering the targeted group 
as non-human in contrast to the humanness of the perpetrators); Organization (the 
actual planning and enacting of administrative and control structures – often state 
sponsored); Polarization (separation of the target group from the rest of the 
population); Preparation (identification and making ready of those to be killed) 
Extermination (the managed (mass-)killing of the now classified, symbolized and 
dehumanised, isolated victims); Denial (the management of information and cover-up 
to avoid recriminations and justice). 
 
Stanton’s schema highlights the management processes enabling each stage of 
genocide but also allows us to view genocide as at once a normal and an exceptional 
event. The early stages of genocide do not require a disclosure of its ultimate aim. 
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They can be rationalized as measures to protect sections of the population, yet they 
enable the building of a genocidal logic which, if left unchecked, may lead to the later 
stages. It would be unthinkable, in the early stages, to claim that killing people 
constitutes a reasonable or legitimate action. Nevertheless, telling a ‘white lie’ or 
‘turning a blind eye’ may become ever more acceptable, leading to some personal 
advantage or avoiding trouble. The coalescence and convergence of such apparently 
multifarious, marginal processes of complicity or collaboration can lead to ever 
greater wrongs and cruelties (Stokes 2006). The initial three stages of Stanton’s 
processual typology allow us to see this very clearly. By permitting or tacitly 
condoning the ‘classification’, ‘symbolization’ and subsequent ‘dehumanization’ of 
their fellow humans, people are complicit, consciously or unconsciously, of setting in 
motion a spiral memorably captured in Pastor Niemoller’s (1892-1984) famous poem: 
 
“They came first for the communists, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a 
communist. 
 
Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a Jew. 
 
Then they came for the trade unionists and I didn’t speak up because I wasn’t a trade 
unionist. 
 
Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn’t speak up because I was a Protestant 
 
Then they came for me, and by that time no one was left to speak up.” 
 
Niemoller’s poem vividly captures how ‘small’ indiscretions escalate to bigger ones, 
ultimately leading to events that can be viewed as apocalyptic. This type of escalation 
is now a widely recognized feature of genocide (see, e.g. Kershaw, 1983) but can also 
be observed in everyday management and organizational practices and sense-making, 
especially as part of a downsizing logic which marginalizes, pathologizes and isolates 
different individuals, groups or departments leading to their elimination. They are the 
inefficient, the ‘dead wood’, the ones who fail to accept change, adapt with the times 
or add value to the organization. In contemporary corporate settings this is not only a 
metaphorical or symbolic ‘death’, but it is often accompanied by rage, self-
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victimization and despair, as well as a wide range of ailments including mental 
breakdown, heart attack and occasionally leading to physical death. In noting 
similarities between Stanton’s insights into genocidal logic and ‘ordinary’ 
organizational phenomena, we are not seeking to make ‘tasteless comparisons’ 
between mass killings and mass layoffs of employees. Physical extermination can 
under no circumstances be equated with symbolic killing nor can summary executions 
be equated to summary dismissals. What we are arguing (and this is a point to which 
we shall return) is that some of the processes noted earlier, notably othering, 
pathologization, dehumanization, symbolization, escalation, as well as some of the 
political and psychological dynamics underpinning them display extensive 
similarities. 
 
In dehumanizing, containing and eventually eliminating the Other, genocide scholars 
have identified some key processes which hold vital lessons for students of 
organization. These include the erection of powerful boundaries which separate the 
Other, the identification of potential sources of resistance and their elimination, the 
emergence of a profound silence fed by shame, fear and disgust, and the spreading of 
divisions among the Other by offering selective privileges or promises of salvation 
through exceptional treatment. In what Stanton termed the ‘organization’ and 
‘polarization’ stages of genocide, people targeted for genocide are identified, marked 
and corralled. Distinctions of ascribed status and the isolation of the future victims in 
camps are important in these stages. Within their isolated zones, victims may further 
be divided up by age, gender or ability to work as happened in Nazi concentration 
camps and during the Bosnian conflict.  
 
The manner and extent of ‘polarization’ merits closer examination. Those among the 
targeted victims likely to be the most resistant are likely to be polarized earlier rather 
than later. Stanton reminds us that in these circumstances it is not only the 
vociferously proactive who are marginalized. He is keen to point up, during the 
polarization stage, the liberally minded and moderately inclined who voice concerns 
are also likely to be marginalized and polarized. Gradually, the identity of the target 
group is constructed as troublesome, problematic and a matter of concern for the rest. 
In essence they are pathologised. Any sign of resistance is treated as further evidence 
of their treacherousness. Sympathizers and ‘neutrals’ are also gradually forced either 
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to collude or to face polarization and exclusion. The polarized group is steadily 
perceived as an unwanted part of society calling for some radical action to neutralize 
or discard. Stanton notes that many of those directing this genocidal process 
genuinely believe that they are doing it for the general social good, a feature they 
share with champions of downsizing, restructuring and re-engineering who see 
individuals, groups and departments that fail to add value to an organization as having 
to be sacrificed for the general good (Knights and Willmott, 2000). The destruction of 
Britain’s mining communities and much of the manufacturing infra-structure in the 
1980s by Margaret Thatcher and her government were also undertaken in the 
conviction that they were serving the nation’s wider good (Marr, 2007).  
 
Beyond the broad polarization created by genocide, a wide range of other gradations 
come into effect. In his discussion of his incarceration at Auschwitz, Primo Levi 
argues that the fundamental polarization of victim and perpetrator does not create an 
empty space between the two, nor does it lead to total homogenization within each 
group. Levi explored the fluidity and porosity of these boundaries through the notion 
of a ‘Grey Zone’ of ambivalent behaviours and roles in his seminal text The Drowned 
and the Saved.  
 
From many signs, it would seem the time has come to explore the space which 
separates (and not only in the Nazi Lagers [camps]) the victims from the 
persecutors, and to do so with a lighter hand, and with a less turbid spirit than 
has been done, for instance in a number of films. Only a schematic rhetoric 
can claim that the space is empty: it never is; it is studded with obscene and 
pathetic figures (sometimes they possess both qualities simultaneously), whom 
it is indispensable to know if we want to know the human species, if we want 
to know how to defend our souls when a similar test should once more loom 
before us, or even if we only want to understand what takes place in a large 
industrial factory. (Levi, 1986/1988: 25-26). 
 
As genocide unfolds, a range of choices continues to be available both to victims and 
to perpetrators, creating further distinctions. For the victims, as Levi has shown, these 
include total capitulation and resignation, passive and active resistance as well as a 
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wide range of techniques of collusion, inner resistance and invisibility aimed at 
physical and psychological survival.  
 
The ascent of the privileged, not only in the Lager [concentration / 
extermination camp] but in all human coexistence, is an anguishing but 
unfailing phenomenon: only in utopias are they absent. It is the duty of 
righteous men to make war on all undeserved privilege, but one must not 
forget that this is a war without end. Where there exists power exercised by 
the few or by only one against the many, privilege is born and proliferates, 
even against the will of the power itself; but on the other hand it is normal for 
power to tolerate and encourage it. Let us confine ourselves to the Lager 
which (even in its Soviet version) can be considered an excellent ‘laboratory’: 
the hybrid class of the prisoner-functionary constitutes its armature and at the 
same time its most disquieting feature. It is a grey zone, with ill-defined 
outlines which both separate and join the two camps of masters and servants. 
It possesses an incredibly complicated internal structure, and contains within 
itself enough to confuse our need to judge.” (Levi, 1986/1988: 27). [Emphasis 
added] 
 
Using Levi’s account as his point of departure, Allen (2002; 2005; 2008) has argued 
that institutions like Auschwitz could never have functioned without countless victims 
forced to serve in its bureaucracies. It was they who offered most of the professional, 
technical and managerial skills necessary for the camps to function. Victims, argues 
Allen, “toiled in what Primo Levi called the grey zone, where the boundaries between 
the persecuted and perpetrators shifted endlessly. Thus if Eichmann was a 'white-
collar' worker, victims were 'grey collar.' This was a labor of hate.”(Allen, 2005, p. 
27) For the perpetrators too, there were choices between active collusion and 
participation in the genocide, active and passive resistance. The extent to which 
segments of the German population knew or participated in the Holocaust is the 
subject of intense debate among genocide scholars, especially since the publication of 
Goldhagen’s (1996) controversial book.  
 
The choices faced by members of ‘ordinary organizations’ may not be as stark. Their 
physical survival may not depend on it, but their jobs, their livelihoods and their 
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psychological survival may depend on how they react when victimized or when they 
witness other groups being victimized. Do they slide into passivity and silence, at the 
risk of finding themselves as the next target? Do they resist actively or passively and 
risk being marginalized and pathologized? Do they collude and risk becoming part of 
a regime of brutalization, from which neither their integrity nor their psychological 
well-being can be protected?  
 
The issue of resistance is one that has long pre-occupied scholars of organizations, 
especially those representing critical management studies and labour process 
traditions. It seems to us that much can be understood by cross-fertilizing their 
insights with the insights into resistance and collusion akin to those delineated above 
generated by genocide scholars. 
 
GENOCIDE AND THE CORPORATION 
The state is undoubtedly the primary organization involved in genocide, but there is a 
longstanding body of evidence of commercial organizations implicated and complicit 
in genocide. Such organizations, more often than not multinational and transnational 
corporations (MNCs and TNCs), frequently work in concert with government and 
quasi-governmental agencies to resource, support and perpetrate genocide (Allen, 
2002). The evidence of corporate involvement in genocide is extensive, but a few 
examples must suffice here. In IBM and the Holocaust (2001), Edwin Black 
documented IBM’s supply of administrative and accounting devices and machinery to 
the Third Reich. This machinery was subsequently employed to organize and account 
for the organization and management of rounding up, deportation, enforced labour 
and extermination of millions of Nazi victims. More recently in Genocide in Nigeria: 
The Ogoni Tragedy (1992), Ken Saro Wiva has sought to bring to light evidence of 
the complicity Shell in degradation of the lands and water resources of the Ogoni 
people of Nigeria and its subsequent collusion with the Nigerian military in 
genocideal actions against them. Saro Wiva was subsequently arrested and executed 
in  1995 by the authorities along with eight other leaders of the Ogoni Tribe. In early 
June 2009, on the eve of trial, Shell agreed to pay (without accepting liability) $15.5 
million (£9.6 miilion) to settle a legal action, brought by relatives of Ken Saro Wiva 
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and the Ogoni Tribe leaders, which accused Shell of having collaborated with the 
authorities in their arrest and execution: 
 
               The company was alleged to have provided the Nigerian Army with  
               vehicles, patrol boats and ammunition and to have helped plan raids and  
               terror campaigns against villages. (Pilkington, 2009) 
 
A more indirect illustration of corporate engagement in genocide has seen a number 
of powerful US corporations, including Northop Grumman, BAe  Systems and 
Chevron, lobbying the United States Government to prevent the use of the term 
genocide in relation to the forced deportation and slaughter of large numbers of 
Armenians by the Ottoman empire. All of the companies have substantial  
commercial interests in Turkey. (Singer, 2009) 
 
Banerjee (2008), while not expressly focusing on genocide, builds on the work of 
Agamben (1998) and, in particular, on Mbembe’s (2003) theory of necropolitics, to 
develop the concept of necrocapitalism describing “contemporary forms of 
organizational accumulation that involve dispossession and the subjugation of life to 
the power of death” (2008, p. 1541). Banerjee argues that different forms of power, 
institutional, material and discursive, generate a political economy of dispossession 
and death, leading to material and spiritual annihilation of entire people, their 
traditions and livelihoods. Banerjee’s argument is informed by current arguments on 
colonialism and postcolonialism and illustrated with examples from Indonesia, 
Malyasia, China, Nigeria and India demonstrating how corporations working in 
tandem with governments, military and paramilitary organizations, marginalize, 
oppress and, at times eliminate, people who stand in the path of potential commercial 
spaces, opportunities and corporate profits. It should be noted that these corporations 
are not necessarily engaged in an explicit and pre-designed genocidal process but the 
outcomes and consequences of their cumulative and repeated actions naturally lead to 
this outcome. 
Symbolic genocides? Destroying lives, destroying meanings 
 
 23
Corporations can be directly or indirectly involved in the business of genocide. The 
business of organizations, however, also makes them terrains of symbolic genocides. 
We now wish to examine  more closely  the fragile parallel between mass killings and 
mass dismissals as a point of connection between genocide literature and scholarship 
of organization and management. We must once again state that in pursuing this 
parallel, we propose no moral or political equivalences, not withstanding the fact that 
an imagery and a vocabulary of genocide frequently pervades the experiences of those 
who find themselves laid off. This imagery and vocabulary has been examined in 
great detail by psychoanalytic anthropologist Howard F. Stein who carried out 
research in numerous organizations undergoing downsizing and has drawn extensive 
parallels between the dynamics of genocide and the extensive damage caused by 
corporate downsizing and restructuring. In Euphemism, Spin, and the Crisis in 
Organizational Life, Stein (1998) argued that the terms used to denote the phenomena 
are euphemisms that represent not a 'social construction of reality' but a systematic 
assault on meaning. Terms such as 'downsizing', 'managed health', 're-engineering', 
‘Total Quality Management’ and so forth are not merely attempts to conceal the brutal 
realities of many American workplaces, but defile the human spirit, by forcing on it a 
seemingly unanswerable logic of markets, economic necessity and bottom lines. In 
this regard, downsizing corrupts the value of words in a manner not dissimilar to that 
noted by Victor Klemperer (2006) in his insightful analysis of the language of the 
Third Reich when he observed an extensive use of recurrent words and expressions 
(“spontaneous”, “eternal”),  prefixes (“world,” “grand,” “people”), neologisms (“sub-
humanity,” “to aryanize,”) and a continuous abuse of superlatives. 
 
In a follow-up study, Stein (2001) argues that many American workplaces have 
become a place of darkness, where emotional brutality is commonplace and different 
forms of psychological violence, dehumanization, including degradation, humiliation 
and intimidation, have become the norm. Behind calls for flexibility among the 
employees, Stein sees the rise of a fundamentalist religion of the bottom line, one 
which is oblivious of all human values and blind to all suffering. The core if 
unacknowledged euphemism which inspires the title of Stein's book is that of 
'collateral damage', the view that no suffering, no lie and no savagery is too great, so 
long as it is justified by the bottom line. People become dispensable pawns, resources 
to be used, exploited and discarded. Today's exploiter becomes tomorrow's discarded 
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pawn, since the religion of the bottom line acknowledges no permanent authority, no 
human is too important to be dispensed with when his/her usefulness is over. This 
creates an ethos of survivalism – a constant anxiety over each individual's and each 
organization's ability to survive in what is construed as an environment of endless 
terrors and turbulence.  
 
Images from the holocaust saturate Stein's observations of corporate America, which 
he documents in a sequence of case studies. The core equation for Stein is an 
experiential and emotional one: 
 
Organizational darkness is not the fact of the 'symbolic' equation of the 
American workplace and the Holocaust, but the emotional experience of 
the workplace that makes the metaphor – and certain recurrent others – 
plausible and, for many, emotionally apt and 'right.' (Stein 2001: 15 
Emphasis in the original). 
 
Stein offers much evidence of a symbolic equation between 'corporate cleansing' and 
'ethnic cleansing', both of which view the survival of the whole (the organization, the 
society) as depending on 'the expulsion of unwanted parts' (p. 69). Stein views the 
grotesque lament of Hans Frank, the odious Governor General of Poland under the 
Nazis, as emblematic of modern management: "My only wish of the Jews is that they 
should disappear." What today's manager wants is that the weak, the ineffectual, the 
recalcitrant, the ones who fail the excellence test and do not add value, should simply 
disappear. And, seeing as nobody is good enough, this ineluctable logic, will 
eventually target each and every person, turning them into the victim of 
organizational cleansing. Thus, this 'expulsion of the unwanted parts' noted by Stein 
becomes part of a phantasy of permanent renewal and eternal life (if only we could 
get rid of the dead wood, all our problems would be solved).  
 
Drawing on Stein’s work, Gabriel (2008a,b) has proposed the concept of miasma as a 
contagious state of pollution – material, psychological and spiritual – that afflicts all 
who work in organizations during periods of rapid change, when staff or whole 
departments ‘disappear’, often without acknowledgement or explanation. Miasma 
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involves a generalized depression, a gradual paralysis of resistance, an experience of 
pollution and uncleanliness, and feelings of worthlessness and corruption. Miasma is 
a feature of all tragedy (“Something is rotten in the state of Denmark” – Hamlet) 
brought about by individuals who commit grave transgressions and the subsequent 
failure of the community to take appropriate  restorative and purification rituals.  
 
In the 19th century, miasma became the linchpin of a theory of medical contagion 
taking place through vapours, a theory that was largely discredited by the discovery 
that most infectious diseases are transmitted through water. Yet, like a highly 
contagious disease (as portrayed, for example, in Camus’ The Plague), miasma 
undermines people’s faith in their institutions and leaders. Attempts to cleanse a city 
of miasma usually have the exact opposite effect, of reinforcing it. The concept of 
‘cleansing’ is what brings miasma at the core of both genocide and many instances of 
organizational downsizing. The Other is viewed in each case as the bringer of the 
miasma, the agent that must be eliminated and from whose presence everyone else 
purged. In wider society, the bringer of miasma may be a racial, religious or ethnic 
group, a group of recent arrivals (like immigrants or refugees) or some other socially 
marginalized group. In organizations, miasma may be attributed to a particular 
department, an age group (e.g. old guard who have become ‘dead-wood’) or, more 
generally, with those seen as unproductive an inefficient.  
 
What makes miasma a potentially useful concept for theorists of organization is that it 
can help explain the absence of resistance in certain organizations, the collapse of 
people’s sense of identity and worth, the silencing of stories and the generalized 
feeling of depression and gloom. Miasma is capable of afflicting everyone but also of 
sparing some people, or as Dodds’ eloquently puts it, it operates “with the same 
ruthless indifference to motive as a typhoid germ” (1968: 36). Miasma usually occurs 
in organizations that undergo a sudden transformation involving the discarding and 
loss of many of their valued members through downsizing or retrenchment, without 
either separation rituals or psychological mourning. The ‘old’ organization is 
frequently presented as corrupt, indulgent and inefficient, contrasted to the ‘new’ 
organization that is entrepreneurial, dynamic and flexible. Yet, for many surviving 
members, the new organization is tainted by the presence of ‘murderers’, i.e. 
managers who have initiated a series of dismissals and ‘corpses’, i.e. employees who 
 26
have been dismissed or are about to be dismissed and ‘disappear’, once alive, now 
discarded.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The most important argument of this article is that genocide is not a phenomenon 
marginal to the world of management and organizations, but one from which these 
disciplines stand to learn a lot and one to which they must contribute their own 
insights. All genocides arouse abhorrence and horror – yet, genocide is a social 
phenomenon of wide variety and complexity, resisting monocausal explanations and 
neat classifications. Modern genocides, as studied by historians, reveal themselves to 
be organized and managed ventures rather than spontaneous spasms of hatred. In this 
respect, they invite at least some explanations from the disciplines of organization and 
management, a project which is still in its very early stages. The main arguments 
developed in this paper are the following: 
 
1. Genocide may constitute an ‘exceptional’ event, exposing perpetrators, victims and 
neutral parties to unique and highly disturbing experiences. Yet, many of the 
psychological, social, political and organizational processes present in genocide are 
not fundamentally different from those that may be encountered in organizational life 
in general. All the same, the presence of ‘hot violence’ in nearly all genocide means 
that comparisons must remain cognisant of unique ontological qualities of genocide 
and the their potential of being experienced as disrespectful or insulting by genocide 
victims and survivors.  
 
2. While there is a tendency to treat genocide as a coherent and uniform type of 
phenomenon, there is a need to differentiate between different types of organization 
present in different genocides, the different relations between perpetrators and victims 
(close neighbours versus faceless individuals), hot and cold violence. 
 
3. There is an enduring tension on the role of morality in genocide and its relation to a 
wider range of social and organizational situations. It particular, there is a question on 
 27
whether genocide represents a failure of morality or an instance of exaggerated zeal in 
applying morality. 
 
4. While genocide creates a brutal cleavage between perpetrators and victims, it also 
creates a wide range of subdivisions, different degrees of victimhood, resistance and 
collusion, different choices and dilemmas and different modes of identity 
construction. 
 
Our paper has also indicated some important areas for further work. In addition to the 
actual organization and management of genocide, scholars can explore a wide nexus 
of possibilities: language, semiotics and discourse, psychological processes of 
othering, distancing and scapegoating, social and political processes of collusion and 
resistance. The technologies of genocide call for close scrutiny, whether involving 
small-scale operations or mass murder; Taylorist, Fordist and post-Fordist 
technologies of genocide and the bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic administration 
deserve a great deal further attention. The links between different organizations 
directly engaged in genocide and those parasitic to it, or more generally the issue of 
cross-organizational collaboration in genocide, also merit scholars’ attention. 
Following Allen (2002; 2005), genocide must also be viewed in a macabre way as a 
very fecund ground for the study of organizational innovation and problem-solving, 
but also as the space for studying organizational cultures and sub-cultures and the 
conflicts between different organizational ideologies and values. Even institutional 
theory can learn much by comparing different institutions of genocide (for example, 
the ways different concentration camps were structured and how they functioned) and 
the tensions between central plans and local initiatives. In all of these ways, 
organizational theorists must shake off their squeamishness about engaging a 
terrifying and tragic phenomenon that stretches sensemaking capacities and tests 
emotional responses to breaking point. They must also undermine the relative comfort 
zones created by unquestioning acceptance of the theses put forward by Arendt and 
Bauman. Far from subsuming genocide into some form of rationality, bureaucratic, 
modernist or other, scholars should probe further into the irrational origins of 
genocide whether linked to systematic generation of nationalist hatred or the search 
for redemption in the elimination of the other. 
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Maybe, however, the main area of further exploration signalled by our paper concerns 
the wide and as yet only partly studied terrains of organizational and social violence, 
in their diverse and frequently invisible forms. These include practices that are not 
classified as genocide but lead to dispossession, human rights abuses, environmental 
plundering, forced movement of people and the destruction of ways of thinking, 
acting and believing (Banerjee, 2000, 2008; Dosal, 1993; Mbembe, 2003; 
Ramasastry, 2002). It seems to us that such an exploration must recognize the 
continuities between genocide and other variants of structural violence without 
obliterating the unique horror and revulsion generated by genocide. 
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